Venezuelan Opposition on Pins and Needles Ahead of US Elections - Venezuelanalysis

Venezuela’s counter-revolutionary forces are navigating a period of uncertainty as the clock starts to tick ahead of Nicolás Maduro’s inauguration as reelected president on January 10, 2025.

This uncertainty arises from the turmoil faced by the opposition’s primary sponsor, the United States, which is currently grappling with its own internal and geopolitical crises. As a result, the US has delegated to Spain the role of main interventionist actor in the Caribbean country.

Moreover, opposition organizations and leaders operating both within Venezuela and abroad are facing deep contradictions, a situation that has only intensified following the July 28 presidential elections.

Since Hugo Chávez assumed power in 1999, the strategies and, in many instances, the specific actions of the right-wing opposition have largely been dictated by Washington. This pattern is not unusual, as the United States has historically played such a role throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as in various other regions worldwide.

Meddling in Venezuela has been relentless, though characterized by the differing approaches of various White House tenants. It is important to recognize that Republican presidents like George W. Bush and Donald Trump have not been more keen in their imperial eagerness than Democratic counterparts such as Bill Clinton, Barack Obama, and Joe Biden. Obama, for instance, issued a decree declaring Venezuela an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to the US national security, a designation that the Biden administration has renewed annually.

The Trump administration (2017-2021) is noted for its particularly aggressive stance, which included a blockade and unilateral coercive measures. Beginning in 2019, the US supported what was presented as an “interim government” that aimed to seize control of Venezuelan assets and bank accounts in the US and other foreign countries.

This “interim government” was spearheaded by the most extreme faction of the Venezuelan opposition but received backing from a wide array of moderate parties and leaders. A strategy of maximum pressure and a complete abandonment of electoral processes became dominant. Alongside the devastating consequences of the economic blockade, the country faced further destabilizing incidents, including a failed assassination attempt, botched invasions, widespread blackouts, and an unsuccessful coup attempt.

Opposition parties and leaders who did not align with the insurrectionary strategy faced intense smear campaigns, branded as “collaborators” of a “dictatorship” and derogatorily labeled “scorpions.” Some opposition figures were subjected to personal sanctions, including visa cancellations, frozen bank accounts, and seizures of US-based assets. Others, fearing similar repercussions, are believed to have opted to support extremist agendas.

Under the Biden administration, a notable ambiguity has characterized US foreign policy. While sanctions have been both maintained and intensified, the plunder of Citgo and other assets has continued, along with insurrectionary efforts—though these are now pursued with less overt fervor than during Trump’s presidency.

To the perplexion of radical factions, some of the coercive measures affecting the oil sector have been relaxed over the past four years. This shift appears to be a response to urgent consumption needs arising from the proxy war that NATO has been waging in Ukraine since 2022, as well as from US support for the zionist genocide in Gaza since last year.

Until recently, the Venezuelan ultra-right pinned its hopes on a Trump victory in the November presidential elections, believing it would herald a return to a hardline, maximum-pressure approach. However, US domestic politics is so submerged in turmoil that this outlook has changed. Trump appears to have softened his stance on Venezuela, occasionally expressing compliments, even if in a sarcastic tone, about President Maduro and the overall security situation in the country. His harsh rhetoric toward immigrants and promises of the largest mass deportation in history do not resonate positively with radical Venezuelan opposition supporters who have migrated to the US, nor with the political elites that have turned this exodus into a lucrative industry.

In recent months, Washington has shifted much of its direct interference efforts to Spain, leaving Venezuela’s extremist factions feeling somewhat abandoned. The US, with growing internal challenges and two active conflicts in distant regions, clearly has other priorities.

The arsonist opposition wing feels that the US has adopted a lenient stance toward Maduro following the elections, expressing frustration over the inconsistent messages from Francisco Palmieri, the official in charge diplomatic relations with Venezuela who operates from Bogotá.

Regardless of the outcome of the US presidential election, uncertainty will persist as the critical date of January 10 approaches, when Nicolás Maduro is expected to be sworn in before Venezuela’s National Assembly (AN). It will be up to the new US government to determine its stance on this issue, undoubtedly influenced by developments in the war in Ukraine and the genocide in the Middle East.

The situation described above reflects a profound division within the opposition spectrum.

On one side stand the radicals who continue to assert that right-wing candidate Edmundo González Urrutia emerged victorious on July 28. They claim he will end his voluntary exile in Spain and return to Venezuela in January to take his oath of office. These factions advocate for an agenda centered on conflict and violence as the new year begins.

On the other side are the opposition parties and leaders who participated in the presidential election with candidates other than Edmundo González Urrutia and have acknowledged Maduro’s victory, as confirmed by the National Electoral Council (CNE) and ratified by both the Electoral Chamber and the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ). These groups and individuals are against new institutional ruptures and instead aim to concentrate on the multiple elections scheduled for 2025, which will encompass the National Assembly, regional legislatures, governorships, mayorships, and municipal councils. They argue that a strong showing in these elections will create a foundation for a recall referendum in 2027 or for the 2030 presidential elections.

This structural divide has caused significant rifts within various important opposition parties, including Acción Democrática, a historically influential social-democratic party that dominated Venezuelan politics throughout the latter half of the 20th century. Acción Democrática is characterized by both moderate and radical factions.

Recently, a conflict has also emerged within the right-wing party Primero Justicia (PJ), which rose to prominence in the early years of the current century under a young, conservative leadership.

Primero Justicia (PJ), which previously split in 2009, leading to the formation of the ultra-right-wing group Voluntad Popular (VP), is now facing a significant internal clash stemming from a power struggle between its two main leaders: two-time presidential candidate Henrique Capriles Radonski and former National Assembly president Julio Borges.

The PJ fracture has deepened since late 2019, when a faction of regional leaders opposed the US-backed decision to extend Juan Guaidó’s presidency of the National Assembly for a second year. Guaidó, a member of VP, had declared himself “interim president” of Venezuela in January of that year.

This controversy gave rise to a new party, Primero Venezuela, which has actively participated in local, regional, parliamentary, and presidential elections, defying the established strategy of boycotting electoral processes. The leader of Primero Venezuela, José Brito, has taken legal action against PJ’s leadership and successfully secured a ruling from the Supreme Court appointing him as head of an ad hoc board of directors.

The Capriles-Borges squabble has exposed the underlying disagreements regarding the so-called interim government, of which Borges served as a flamboyant “foreign minister.”

Internal cracks within the opposition are further exacerbated by the rise of ultra-right-wing leader María Corina Machado, who has positioned herself as the face of anti-Chavismo in recent years, despite her disqualification from holding public office. She seeks to establish herself as the main leader of the opposition, yet many national figures—especially those at the helm of significant political parties—are resisting her authority, either openly or covertly. This resistance is particularly pronounced among influential party leaders such as Manuel Rosales, the Governor of Zulia and head of the social-democratic party Un Nuevo Tiempo (UNT).

As a heiress from Caracas’ oligarchic elites, Machado seeks to assert her dominance over the anti-Chavista movement by promoting a rhetoric that advocates for the elimination of her political adversaries. She also relies on the results of the 2023 primary election, tailored to her interests, to bolster her leadership claim. Additionally, she has attempted to take credit for the alleged victory of González Urrutia, who was merely a figurehead on campaign posters and ballots, since Machado was the one actively campaigning across the nation.

Machado, who has declared herself to be “in hiding,” is reportedly planning to instigate chaos in the country by late 2024 and early 2025. According to Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, she aims to redeploy violent groups known as “comanditos,” who were active during the July 29 and 30 riots, which resulted in 27 deaths. The plan would also involve US mercenaries, Colombian paramilitaries, and defectors from the Venezuelan army and police, using weapons allegedly smuggled into the country with US support.

Machado is banking on a Trump victory, which she believes would bolster her argument for a violent resolution through US intervention or a multinational force. However, a significant portion of the opposition rejects this approach, advocating instead for a focus on upcoming elections and the electoral future that lies ahead.

As long as the US remains in an electoral limbo and the outlook for its next government remains uncertain, the core of the Venezuelan opposition will be mired in suspense, hesitation, and mutual surprises. This is the price to pay for a strategic and tactical dependence on imperial power.

Clodovaldo Hernández is a journalist and political analyst with experience in higher education. He won the National Journalism Prize (Opinion category) in 2002. He is the author of the books Reinventario (poetry and short stories) De genios y de figuras (journalistic profiles) and Esa larga, infinita distancia (novel).

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelanalysis editorial staff.

Translated by Venezuelanalysis.

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